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INTRODUCTION 
When Gibbon wrote that "The principal conquests of the Romans were 
achieved under the republic; and the emperors, for the most part, were 
satisfied with preserving those dominions which had been acquired ... "1• 
he echoed a sentiment that has been accepted almost unquestioningly 
ever since. For the subsequent two centuries the accepted view of the 
external policy of the Roman empire has placed too much emphasis on 
the Varian disaster and the consequent consilium coercendi intra 
terminos imperii of Augustus2 and so has failed to accept imperialist 
motivations in any post-Augustan territorial increase. 
The framework for most modem discussions of the principate has been 
that any expansion after 9 A.D. was purely the result of exceptional 
strategic or political requirements. Claudius' annexation of Britain is 
not recognized as the blatant territorial aggrandizement it was, but is 
dismissed because necessitated by considerations of internal politics. 
The annexations of Dacia and Arabia by Trajan, and his later Parthian 
expedition, are excused as being responses to external aggression, or as 
attempts to increase the security of the empire by establishing so-called 
'scientific frontiers'3. Hadrian, by abandoning all Trajan's conquests 
east of the Euphrates and his subsequent lack of interest in campaigning, 
is often viewed as having returned to the policy of Augustus. Antoninus 
Pius, despite the fact that under him the imperial frontiers in Britain 
and of the Rhine provinces reached what was to be their greatest extent, 
is seen as following in Hadrian's footsteps. Marcus Aurelius is still 
respected as the archetypal 'philosopher-emperor' who was unfortunate 
in having to spend most of his reign fighting wars to defend the empire 
against encroaching barbarians. Septimius Severns, in purely territorial 
terms the most expansionist post-Augustan emperor, is widely regarded 
as untypical and an aberration. In spite of the apparent contradictions 
1 E. Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 1776, reprint New York, 
1963, p. 107. 
2 Tacitus, Annals, I.ll 
3 This is the argument much-favoured by E. N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the 
Roman Empire from the First Century AD. to the Third, Baltimore, 1976 
(paperback edition 1979), pp. 107-8. 
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inherent in such a position, it is still the dominant view of Roman 
frontier policy under the Principate. 
In my view a better framework for analysis of Roman imperialism in 
the post-Augustan world sees external policy during the Principate as 
being dependent on a continuing state of tension between those elements 
of the ruling class that held to the politics of expansion, and those which 
adhered to the politics of the 'surfeited empire'. There can be no doubt 
that such differences of opinion existed and had an effect on emperors. 
Despite Luttwak's view of the matter, external policy during the 
Principate was demonstrably inconsistent. This helps explains why 
Tiberius, having helped Augustus acquire more territory than any other 
Roman leader, was content to keep the empire as it had been left to him, 
and why Claudius, impelled by political needs, accepted the ideological 
option and annexed Britain, earning in the process four triumphs. The 
Flavian emperors, very much 'new men' after a century of the Julio-
Claudians, and needing military prestige, made provinces of most of the 
client kingdoms of Asia Minor as well as adding the Agri Decumates to 
the empire, a valid, if easy, method of enlarging the empire. 
The second century was no different. Trajan, still regarded as the 
archetypal 'soldier-emperor', added more to the empire than any other 
emperor after Augustus by his annexation of Dacia, Arabia, and, 
although unsuccessful, Armenia and Mesopotamia. These wars of 
Trajan, as I hope to demonstrate, were motivated primarily by nothing 
more than a desire for territorial aggrandisement. Trajan's attention to 
civic projects such as his alimenta scheme for poor children and the 
maintenance of the corn supply should not divert us from his military 
ambitions. Indeed his attempt at blending the traditional elements of 
military glory and civic activities, but always with the main emphasis 
on martial achievements, goes far to confirming his pre-eminent 
position as the best of Rome's emperors, no less than the optimus 
princeps described by Pliny and Dio Chrysostom. 
Under Trajan, as Luttwak has pointed out, "wars were feverishly 
anticipated, and this time there was no disappointment"4• After two 
4 Luttwak, p. 54. 
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wars fought over a period of five years, Dacia was annexed as a 
province in 105/6. Arabia, hitherto a client kingdom, was also made a 
province in 105/6, possibly in advance preparation for the Parthian 
wars. After a number of decisive military engagements in the east 
Armenia became a province in 114, and Mesopotamia likewise in 115. 
Trajan made alterations in the administrative arrangements for the 
provinces: Pannonia was divided into two imperial provinces, Superior 
and Inferior; Thrace was made an imperial province; and Galatia-
Cappadocia was again separated into two imperial provinces. Imperial 
provinces, always with the exception of Egypt, were invariably at this 
time governed by legati Augusti pro praetore, and it is tempting to see 
in this creation of three extra imperiallegateships a move by Trajan to 
create additional posts that could be used as rewards for his successful 
generals and supporters5. 
Hadrian who had a traditional, if not a particularly successful, military 
career, is generally seen as peace-loving and non-expansionist. The 
contrast is all the more obvious following so closely on the military 
expeditions of Trajan. Trajan was widely loved and served as a model 
for how all future emperors should behave, indeed was seen as the best 
type of autocratic ruler even in the middle ages. Hadrian died "hated by 
the people" according to Dio6. It is implied that this was due to his 
murder of various members of the Senate, particularly the four 
Trajanic consulars who were put to death, either on Hadrian's direct 
order or by a Senate intent on sycophancy. The deed, whatever its 
necessity and whoever its author, went down the years in infamy. 
According to Dio it was one of the primary reasons the Senate refused 
to deify the dead emperor in 1387• The long period in which Augustus 
reconciled the Roman aristocracy to the Principate did not, and could 
not, bring an end to political discord within the Senate. Adherents and 
friends of a particular emperor came to the fore on his accession and 
held sway in the Senate. The killings of 117 were either ordered by 
Hadrian or advocated by the emperor's partisans in the Senate with his 
knowledge and agreement. 
5 A. Garzetti, From Tiberius to the Antonines, A History of the Roman Empire A.D. 
14-192, tr. J.R. Foster, London, 1974, p. 345. 
6 Cassius Dio, LXIX, 23.2. 
7 Dio, LXIX, 23.2-3. 
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It is hard to see in these killings anything but an attempt to remove 
vocal critics of Hadrian's foreign policy. The four put to death were all 
consulars and at least three of them were highly talented and successful 
military commanders. There might well have been a plot, if these 
leading generals were dissatisfied, as they might well have been, with 
Hadrian's withdrawal from the East and parts of Moesia. The existence, 
or otherwise of a plot against the new emperor does not alter the point 
that the most likely explanation for the deaths is the opposition between 
the expansionists as exemplified by these four consulars, and the static 
imperialists as exemplified by Hadrian and his friends and advisers. In 
his latter days Hadrian is said to have denied any participation in the 
deaths and even to have destined Nigrinus for the succession8. I cannot 
accept this. The source for this was seemingly Hadrian's autobiography, 
surely not the most unbiased of sources. And that Hadrian in early 118 
can have spent time considering the succession, let alone have made a 
decision, seems highly improbable. 
Now the Senate may have seen itself opposed to the autocracy of 
emperors (although I doubt this) but senators' memories were not that 
long or unforgiving. There must have been more to the senate's attitude 
in 138 than four deaths 20 years before. Why can we not suppose that 
the hostile tradition arises in part from Hadrian's continuing refusal to 
allow the expansionists to have their way? It was not a person who 
respected either the Senate or tradition who put an equestrian in charge 
of both Pannonia and Moesia with the same powers as the prefect of 
Egypt. It was not a respecter of tradition who gave up conquered 
territory, or who built fortified border walls; or who indulged in 
gladiatorial combat in public. In these matters Hadrian showed himself 
an innovator. It is equally plausible that his external policy was a 
departure from the Roman tradition of expansion and as such incurred 
the hatred of more traditional senators. 
Hadrian's successor, Antoninus Pius, had held no military commands in 
his career, nor had he served time away from Rome except for the 
proconsulate of Asia in 134/5. It may well be that he was chosen for 
8 SHA, Hadrian, VII.2. 
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this as much as any other reason9• One of the first actions of Antoninus 
Pius, when he succeeded Hadrian, was to push the frontier of Britain 
forward (discussed below, p. 106f). It is highly probable, as A.R. 
Birley has suggested, that this was a 'sop' thrown to the military 
traditionalists who had been held in check for so long10• At the same 
time the frontiers of the Rhine provinces were moved forward about 40 
kilometres, although this was more likely to have been recognition of 
the extent of Roman military control than outright territorial expansion 
(see below, p. 119f.). It is certain that no other territorial 
aggrandisement took place under Antoninus, as the traditional view of 
him would lead us to expect. Unlike Hadrian, Antoninus had excellent 
relations with the senate. It is possible that this good reputation was a 
product of the emperor's attempts to appease all shades of senatorial 
opinion, including those who had been neglected by Hadrian. And it is 
unlikely that he would antagonise senators when he was able to avoid it. 
What better way of legitimising his position and propitiating the senate 
than by allowing the active expression of different policy options? 
Marcus Aurelius, who is still remembered as a philosopher rather than 
a soldier, spent most of his reign away from Rome fighting barbarians. 
For once a war in the east was begun by Parthia, although the presence 
of a Roman force well inside Armenia cannot be adequately explained. 
Evidence suggests that Lucius Verus' eastern wars resulted in the 
stationing of Roman troops in Armenia and northern Mesopotamia. 
Even if no new territory was annexed, Rome must have effectively 
controlled these one-time provinces of Trajan as a result of the war. 
There is ample evidence as well that Marcus Aurelius intended to annex 
Marcomannic and Sarmatian territories through his northern wars 11 . 
We also have evidence in the Historia Augusta of a difference in 
opinion between the two emperors on the northern operations which 
might indicate that each held to a different position on the issue of 
external policy12• 
There is clear evidence for Commodus' abandonment of his father's 
9 A.R. Birley, "Roman Frontier Policy under Marcus Aurelius" in RFS 7, p. 8. 
10 Birley, RFRFP, p. 17. 
11 See the discussion in Birley, "Roman Frontier Policy under Marcus Aurelius", p. 
10-11. 
l2 SHA, Marcus Antoninus, XN.4-7. See the discussion below, p. 133f. 
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northern wars in the Historia Augusta 13• The speech of Pompeianus 
recorded in Herodian, while not necessarily accurate, at least indicates 
that different opinions were held by those who advised the new 
emperor. Commodus clearly came down on the side of the non-
expansionists, ignoring the older military men who had advised his 
father14 . It is also noteworthy that under Commodus the defensive 
fortifications on the Danube were markedly increased, also suggesting 
that the anti-expansionist policy had gained the ascendancy. 
The evidence given above, not necessarily conclusive, certainly suggests 
the existence of a dichotomy in approaches to Roman external policy at 
least during the first two centuries of the Principate. If not compelling 
it is, nevertheless, an encouragement to further examination in more 
detail of the functioning of Roman external policy in the light of the 
existence in Roman political opinion of an imperialist option of 
expansion. 
13 SHA, Commodus, III.5. Also Cassius Dio, LXXII, 1.2. 
14 Herodian, I, 6.4-8. 
